We formalize the Keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output ‡uctuations under rational expectations. When production decisions must be made under imperfect information about aggregate demand, optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic self-ful…lling rational expectations equilibria in standard economies without aggregate shocks, externalities, persistent informational frictions, or even any strategic complementarity. Our general equilibrium model is deliberately simple, but could serve as a benchmark for more complicated equilibrium models with additional features.
Introduction
We formalize the Keynesian insight that sentiments about aggregate demand can generate output and employment ‡uctuations in a rational expectations framework. In our benchmark model each …rm must make a production decision before demand is realized, based on noisy signals about what its demand will be. The signals, based on initial inquiries, advance sales, early orders, market research and public forecasts about the state of the economy, provide imperfect information about …rm-level demand and aggregate demand. After production decisions are made, demand is realized and prices adjust to clear the market. In this set-up …rms have signal extraction problems that can lead to multiple equilibria and endogenous ‡uctuations in aggregate output.
Self-ful…lling stochastic equilibria in our model are not based on randomizations over fundamental certainty equilibria. Since at such equilibria …rms make their production decisions based on the correctly anticipated distribution of aggregate demand and their own idiosyncratic demand shocks, these self-ful…lling stochastic equilibria are consistent with rational expectations. Furthermore we obtain such equilibria even though we have strategic substitutability in …rms'actions: the optimal production of each …rm is a declining function of other …rms'total output.
Our model is similar to that of Angeletos and Lao (2011) in that sentiments can drive output and that our self-ful…lling equilibria are not based on randomizations over fundamental certainty equilibria. The fundamental certainty equilibrium not driven by sentiments is in fact unique in our model. Our informational structure is also simple: trades take place in centralized markets rather than bilaterally through random matching, and at the end of the period all trading history is public knowledge. Informational asymmetries exist only within the period as …rms decide on how much to produce on the basis of the signals they receive at the beginning of the period.
Our benchmark model is of course also related to the Lucas (1972) island model and its signal extraction problem. However unlike Lucas (1972) we obtain multiple rational expectations equilibria. In the absence of aggregate shocks, we get a unique rational expectations equilibrium in which output and aggregate demand are constant, and …rms receive signals that reveal their idiosyncratic demand shocks. This is our fundamental certainty equilibrium. If however agents believe that their signals contain "information" about changes in aggregate demand, and that the signals attach suf…cient (more than one half) weight to this information, then all …rms will adjust their production in response. Furthermore there will exist an equilibrium belief about the distribution of aggregate demand that is self-ful…lling: if …rms use this distribution in making optimal decisions then indeed this distribution of output will be realized over time. 1 So we obtain an additional rational expectations equilibrium that, in contrast to the fundamental certainty equilibrium, will exhibit aggregate ‡uctuations in output and employment despite the lack of any fundamental aggregate shocks. We characterize this self-ful…lling equilibrium and show that its mean output is lower than the output under the certainty equilibrium.
It may also be interesting to contrast the results of our model with those obtained under global games (see, for example, Morris and Shin, 1998) . In global games multiple coordination equilibria can become unique once agents receive a small, noisy, private signal about an economic fundamental. By contrast in our model we start with a unique equilibrium that has constant output, but when we introduce perceived private uncertainty about aggregate demand, an endogenous variable, we obtain additional equilibria with stochastic output. These additional equilibria, however, disappear when the weight given to aggregate demand uncertainty in the noisy signal becomes small. Our paper is related to others in the global games literature where endogenous variables provide further information about the underlying fundamentals. Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinki (2006) introduce an endogenous public signal, the market clearing interest rate for bonds, into a currency crisis model. The agents can then condition their demand for domestic bonds vs. foreign currency both on the endogenous interest rate and their private signal about the central bank's commitment to the peg. Angeletos and Werning (2011) introduce a publicly traded asset into a similar model. When the public signal is exogenous, agents rely heavily on the private signal if its relative precision is high. Since private signals are dispersed, multiple coordination equilibria can be ruled out. However, if the public signal, the price of the asset, is endogenous and its precision is related to that of the private signal, coordination is facilitated and the uniqueness of the equilibrium can be lost. In both cases the endogenous price helps disseminate information about the underlying fundamental to restore the multiplicity of coordination equilibria. Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) also examine how policy choices can reveal information about fundamentals in global games (about the type of policy maker in this instance), and destroy the uniqueness of the equilibrium that would be obtained when policy choices are uninformative. 2 In our model, however, the mechanism for the multiplicity of equilibria arises directly through the e¤ect of perceived aggregate demand uncertainty on the optimal output of …rms. There exists a distribution of the perceived uncertainty which generates a self-ful…lling stochastic rational expectations equilibrium in addition to the constant output certainty equilibrium. 3 In the sections below we describe …rst the benchmark model and derive the various equilibria.
Section 5 introduces more general signal structures. Since we abstract from capital accumulation and avoid the persistence of informational rigidities, each period is independent of the past. We show in section 6 that we can obtain persistence in output ‡uctuations using a variety of mechanisms, including Markov sunspots across equilibria, multiple islands, productivity shocks, and time-varying parameters. Section 7 extends our main result to more general settings. In particular, Section 7.1 provides a more abstract version of the model that captures the main forces responsible for the existence of self-ful…lling stochastic equilibria. In section 7.2 we introduce a related competitivemarket model where …rms must make investment decisions before observing their idiosyncratic productivity shocks and the aggregate capital stock that determines the market rate of return. In section 7.3, we modify a canonical price setting model with imperfect information. We show that in all such models there exist self-ful…lling stochastic rational expectations equilibria in addition to a unique certainty equilibrium. Finally in section 8 we conclude. 2 See Atkeson (2001) for an early discussion of endogenous information and multiplicity in models of global games, and Amador and Weil (2012) for a study of the welfare e¤ects of endogenous public market signals in a microfounded monetary model. 3 For a related model where endogenous market signals can generate multiple equilibria in a microfounded monetary model, see Gaballo (2012) .
The Benchmark Model
The model has a representative household, a representative …nal goods producer, and a continuum of monopolistic intermediate-goods producers indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. The intermediate-goods producers decide on how much to produce based on their observation of a noisy signal re ‡ecting initial inquiries, advance sales, early orders and market research. Formally the signal is s jt = " jt +(1 )z t where " jt is an idiosyncratic demand shock to their own good j and z t is the stochastic component of aggregate demand in the self-ful…lling equilibrium. In section 5 below, we generalize the signal structure to introduce a …rm-speci…c iid noise to s jt ; and then a second noisy public signal on aggregate demand based on public forecasts of the economy.
Households
A representative household maximizes utility
The budget constraint for the household is
where W t denotes real wage and t aggregate pro…t income from …rms, all measured in …nal goods.
Denoting t as the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint, the …rst-order conditions imply
or
Final Goods Producers
The …nal goods …rm produces output according to
where > 1:The …nal goods producer maximizes pro…t
The exponential 1 on the idiosyncratic shock is just a normalization to simplify expressions later on. The …rst-order condition with respect to input Y jt is
this implies
Substituting the last equation into the production function and rearranging gives
Intermediate Goods Producers
Each intermediate goods …rm produces good j to meet its demand Y jt without perfect knowledge about either jt or the aggregate demand Y t which could also be random. Instead, as in the Lucas island model, they infer their demand from a signal s jt ;
where re ‡ects the weights assigned by …rms to the idiosyncratic and aggregate components of demand. The signal is based on early orders, initial inquiries, advance sales, and market research.
On the basis of its signal, the …rm chooses its production to maximize pro…ts.
An intermediate goods producer j has the production function
So the …rm maximizes expected nominal pro…ts
The …rst order condition for quantity Y jt is given by
Using equation (4), we impose the equilibrium condition
Since we can either normalize the aggregate …nal good price P t or the aggregate nominal wage to 1, for simplicity we choose to set W t = 1. Equation (14) then becomes
The …nal aggregate output is
Note from (17) that the optimal …rm output in equilibrium declines with aggregate output since 1 1 < 0, which implies that we have strategic substitutability. Despite this, we will show that the rational expectations equilibrium is not unique.
An equilibrium consists of equations (17), (18), (4) and the …nal goods market clearing condition
such that the quantities and prices are all consistent with each other.
The Certainty Equilibrium
There exists a fundamental certainty equilibrium in this economy, de…ned as the allocation with Y t = Y and P t = P . Under this certainty equilibrium with constant aggregate demand information is perfect and the signal fully reveals the …rm's own demand. Equation (17) becomes
or if we use P t =
1
Yt , this equation is identical to
Substituting into equation (10) gives
Hence, equation (4) implies
Since aggregate output is constant in the certainty equilibrium, the …rms know their idiosyncratic
shocks from their signals. Then if their demand curve shifts by " jt units, their optimal output will change in such a way as to leave their prices invariant, so all …rms will charge the same price. (To see this substitute 8 into (14).) Substituting equation (20) into equation (18) gives
If without loss of generality we normalize 1 1 A = 1 we have
where " jt log jt has zero mean and variance 2 " . Therefore, under the assumption of log normal distribution,
which is an alternative way of expressing equation (23).
A Self-ful…lling Equilibrium
We conjecture that there exists another equilibrium, such that aggregate output is not a constant.
In particular we assume that
where z t is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and variance 2 z . The noisy signal received by each …rm is
so that with ‡uctuations in aggregate output, the …rm's signal is no longer fully revealing 4 .
We may view z t as a sentiment held by agents about aggregate demand, as perceived through their signals s jt . We will show that in our self-ful…lling equilibrium the distribution of the sentiments fz t g assumed by the …rms will be consistent with the realized distribution of aggregate output fY t g
given by equation (28). 5 Proposition 1 If 2 0; 
Proof. See the Appendix.
If …rms believe that their signals contain information about changes in aggregate demand in addition to the …rm-level demand shocks, then these beliefs will partially coordinate their output responses, up or down, and sustain self-ful…lling ‡uctuations consistent with their beliefs about the distribution of output. Both the variance of the sentiment shock 2 z and a¤ect the …rms' optimal output responses through their signal extraction problems. Given and the variance of the idiosyncratic shock 2 " ; for markets to clear for all possible realizations of the aggregate demand sentiment z t ; the variance 2 z has to be precisely pinned down, as indicated in Proposition 1. 6 If however agents perceive that the signal comes with a low weight on aggregate as opposed to idiosyncratic demand, that is if 2 [0:5; 1] and the covariance of the signal with aggregate demand is low, then a positive variance 2 z that will clear the markets for every z t does not exist. 4 Note that here we de…ne the signal as the weighted sum of the idiosyncratic shock and the innovation to aggregate demand. The mean of the log of aggregate demand will be absorbed by the constant 0 in equation (28) and incorporated into output decisions of …rms. So sjt = "jt + (1 )yt is equivalent to sjt = "jt + (1 )zt as 0 is common knowledge. 5 Under an alternative approach, …rms could simply start with the belief that their signals are correlated. They would choose optimal outputs based on their signals and their beliefs about the distribution (that is 2 z ) of aggregate output. In a self-ful…lling equilibrium, the variance of aggregate output 2 z would be restricted as in Propositions 1, or later below in Propositions 3 or 4, to ensure that the goods market clears. With this restriction, the distribution of shocks zt and jt (and also the distribution of the noise vjt in section 5 below) would induce a distribution on the signals sjt:Given their signals sjt the …rms would optimally choose yjt: We can interpret the self-ful…lling equilibrium as a correlated equilibrium that follows from the optimal output choices of …rms given the market clearing variance of aggregate output 2 z and the distribution of signals induced by the shocks. Such equilibria are typically de…ned for …nite games with a …nite number of agents and discrete strategy sets, but for an extention to continuous games see Hart and Schmeidler (1989) and more recently Stein, Parillo, and Ozdaglar (2008). We thank Martin Schneider for alerting us to this point. 6 To see this look at equations (A.10), (A.11) and (A.20) in the proof of the Proposition in the Appendix.
and > 1, in equilibrium …rm-level outputs as well as markups depend negatively on aggregate output because intermediate goods are substitutes. 7 Hence, if we ignore …rm-speci…c demand shocks, the certainty or fundamental equilibrium in the model will be unique as a result of this strategic substitutability. However, the optimal supply of the …rm's output positively depends on …rm-level demand shocks. Consequently, if …rms cannot distinguish …rm-level shocks from aggregate demand, informational strategic complementarities can arise, giving rise to self-ful…lling equilibria.
The optimal output of an intermediate goods …rm declines with 2 z as the …rm attributes more of the signal to an aggregate demand shock. In the self-ful…lling equilibrium, 2 z is determined at a value that will clear markets for all z. In particular, note that the mean output 0 in the self-ful…lling equilibrium will be lower than the output 0 under the certainty equilibrium, and the mean markup will be higher.
If
= 1 and the signal attaches no weight to sentiments regarding aggregate demand, the signal fully reveals the idiosyncratic shock and the only equilibrium is the certainty equilibrium with constant aggregate output. When = 1 each …rm produces according to its own demand shocks, and the aggregate output is constant. If = 0 on the other hand, then again the certainty equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. In this case …rms do not know their own demand but they do know the aggregate demand. Hence each …rm produces a constant quantity related to aggregate demand based on the expected value of their own demand shock. This is equivalent to setting the idiosyncratic shocks to a constant so that the certainty equilibrium is the only equilibrium.
More General Signal Structures

Imperfect signals with …rm-speci…c noise
So far we have assumed that …rms can get an initial signal for the overall demand for their product, but cannot disaggregate it into its components arising from idiosyncratic and aggregate demand.
Since the signals are based on early and initial demand indications for each of the …rms, they may well contain an additional …rm-speci…c noise component. Suppose then that the signal takes the slightly more general form,
where v jt is a pure …rm-speci…c iid noise with zero mean and variance 2 v . As before we de…ne log Y t = y t = 0 + z t and we also set = 1 2
. In this setup, both the certainty equilibrium and the selfful…lling equilibrium will be di¤erent from those of the benchmark setting of Proposition 1. We …rst state the result for the certainty equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Under the signal given by (30) there is a constant certainty equilibrium, y t =~ 0 ;
given by~
Note that if 2 v = 0; then = 1 and 0 = 0 ; so the solution reduces the previous benchmark case given by (27). The self-ful…lling equilibrium is given by the following Proposition.
, and 2 v < (1 2 ) 2 " . In addition to the certainty equilibrium given in Equation (31), there also exists a self-ful…lling rational expectations equilibrium with stochastic aggregate output, log Y t ; that has a mean
Notice that if either
, then 2 z < 0, suggesting that the only equilibrium is z t = 0. Hence, to have a self-ful…lling expectations equilibrium, we require 2 0;
. This pins down the equilibrium value of 2 z > 0, the variance of z t or aggregate output as a function of 2 " and 2 v . Note that introducing the extra noise v jt into the signal makes output in the self-ful…lling equilibrium less volatile. This is in contrast to the previous case where the signal was s jt = " jt + (1 ) z t ; and the variance of output was
The reason for the smaller volatility of output when 2 v > 0 is that the signal now is more noisy, and …rms attribute a smaller fraction of the signal to demand ‡uctuations. Note however that this requires the additional restriction that the variance of the extra noise cannot be too big,
Multiple Sources of Signals
The government and public forecasting agencies as well as news media often release their own forecasts of the aggregate economy. Such public information may in ‡uence and coordinate output decisions of …rms and a¤ect the equilibria. Suppose …rms receive two independent signals, s jt and s pt . The …rm-speci…c signal s jt is based on a …rm's' own preliminary information about its demand and is identical to that in equation (30). The public signal in the case of the self-ful…lling equilibrium is
where we can interpret e t as common noise in the public forecast of aggregate demand with mean 0 and variance 2 e . We also assume that 2 e = 2 z , where > 0. This assumption states that the variance of the forecast error of the public signal for aggregate demand is proportional to the variance of z; or equilibrium output. Then in the certainty equilibrium where output is constant over time, the public forecast of output is correct and constant as well. 8 Proposition 4 If < 1 2 , and 2 v < (1 2 ) 2 " , then there exists a self-ful…lling rational expectations equilibrium with stochastic aggregate output log Y t = y t = z t + e t + 0 ẑ t + 0 , which has
1 . In addition, there is a certainty equilibrium with constant output identical to that given in Proposition 2 with 2 z = 2 e = 0.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 4, when
v ; the optimal weight that …rms place on the public signal is zero. Nevertheless aggregate output is stochastic, and driven by the volatility ofẑ t z t + e t :
It is easy to see that the certainty equilibrium of Proposition 2 with 2 z = 0 also applies Proposition 4 since we also have 2 e = 2 z = 0, i.e. the public signal also becomes a constant. We can then directly apply Proposition 2 to …nd the equilibrium output (see the proof in Appendix A4).
Persistence
We have shown that imperfect information can lead to self-ful…lling ‡uctuations. By construction, these ‡uctuations are iid across time. We now extend our baseline model to allow for persistent 8 See also the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix. ‡uctuations in various ways. First, we show that it is possible to construct Markov sunspot equilibria. Depending on the sunspot, the agents coordinate on either the certainty equilibrium or on the stochastic equilibrium. Second, we consider a Multiple-Island Economy, in which a fraction t of islands are in the certainty equilibrium while the rest are in the uncertainty equilibrium. The total output of all islands hence ‡uctuates persistently if t are hit by persistent shocks. Third we introduce productivity shocks that can be persistent, and we show that output in a self-ful…lling equilibrium inherits the stochastic properties of the productivity shock. Finally, we introduce time variation into the parameters of the signal, or more precisely, into the weights and (1 ) entering the sum of the idiosyncratic and the aggregate demand shocks. Such variations generate an expected time variation or GARCH behavior in the equilibrium variance of output. In all these cases, the persistence of output ‡uctuations does not require persistent imperfection information across periods.
Markov Sunspot Equilibria
We now construct a persistent sunspot equilibrium with Markov transitions between the certainty equilibrium and the self-ful…lling stochastic equilibrium. To construct such an equilibrium, we introduce a sunspot S t = 1 or 0: We have the transition probabilities Pr(S t = 1jS t 1 = 1) =
and Pr(S t = 0jS t 1 = 0) = . Then the stationary distribution is Pr(S 1 = 1) =
, and
. The agents observe the sunspots …rst and if S t = 1, the coordinate on the certainty equilibrium but if S t = 0, they coordinate on the uncertainty equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates how the economy alternates between periods of calm (the certainty equilibrium) and high volatility (the self-ful…lling stochastic equilibrium). Of course the frequency and duration of volatile periods can be adjusted by changing the parameters of the transition matrix, and . Because the self-ful…lling stochastic equilibrium has a lower mean output and employment, an econometrician who does not believe in sunspots may incorrectly infer from the ‡uctuations that the economy has been hit by a permanent negative technology shock with a higher variance. Conversely, because the certainty equilibrium has a higher mean and a lower variance, an econometrician may incorrectly infer that the economy has entered a period of "great moderation" under "good luck".
Multiple-Island Economy
Now consider an economy with a continuum of identical islands of measure 1. The households on each island have utility functions as in equation (1) 
To construct aggregate sunspot ‡uctuations in output, let a fraction 1 t of islands have the self-ful…lling equilibria in each period. So we have
We now show that^ 0 is no larger than 0 . Notice that the term^ 0 0 is equivalent to
Rearranging terms, the above inequality can be written as:
This inequality holds strictly if 6 = 1 2 . Since t can be any stochastic sunspot process, it can generate persistence in output according to equation (34). An increase in t allows more islands to coordinate on the certainty equilibrium, which reduces overall uncertainty and results in a higher aggregate output.
Productivity Shocks
If productivity A t is a stochastic process that …rms can observe before making production decisions, in the self ful…lling equilibrium of our benchmark model we can express output as
Using equation (17) but now setting 1 1 1 instead of 1 1 At to unity, market clearing requires the sum of log outputs of …rms to equal aggregate log output for every z t , as in equation (A.10). However, as easily computed, the term log A t now cancels out, so equilibrium is consistent with any stochastic process for log A t . Since preferences are logarithmic in consumption and linear in leisure, and consumption is equal to output, optimal labor supply is constant and independent of A t . Therefore log Y t inherits the stochastic properties of A t and exhibits the same persistence as log A t in the self-ful…lling equilibrium. Similarly, in the fundamental equilibrium log Y t also includes log A t as an additive term with a coe¢ cient of 1, but as before, does not depend on z t:
Time-varying
Suppose is time varying and follows the AR(1) process:
where = 0:25 and the iid shock v t has support (1 ) ; (1 ) . It can be shown that t is bounded between 0 and 1 2 . In this economy, all aggregate variables in the self-ful…lling equilibrium are subject to additional shocks so that the variance of equilibrium aggregate demand is timevarying across periods, with
leading to GARCH behavior even though 2 " is constant. This …ts the observed behavior of unemployment and in ‡ation (where GARCH behavior was …rst discovered). The time variability of may re ‡ect changes in how the signal captures the idiosyncratic and perceived aggregate demand shocks over time. Note that enters the "constant" term in Propositions 1-4, which in equilibrium would also vary across periods.
General Models
So far we have relied on a particular general equilibrium model to generate self-ful…lling stochastic equilibria. In this section, we show that such equilibria can exist in more general settings. We …rst use a more abstract model to illustrate this point. We then construct two additional examples to show that our approach to constructing self-ful…lling stochastic equilibria can be applied in other economic environments, where an individual's action depends on his/her expectation of a mix of their idiosyncratic shock and the aggregate of actions.
A More Abstract Model
To illustrate the forces at work that produce the self-ful…lling stochastic equilibrium, we can abstract from the household and production side of our model. Let us assume for simplicity that the economy is log-linear, so optimal log output (or investment, price, labor, etc.) of …rms is given by the rule
This log-linear speci…cation allows us to avoid any constant term in the equilibrium output, so we can maintain a zero mean for y t . The coe¢ cient can be either negative or positive, so we can have either strategic substitutability or strategic complementarity in …rms'actions. The signal s jt is given by
where both the exogenous noise v jt and the idiosyncratic demand shock " jt are iid and normally distributed with a zero mean. Market clearing then requires
In the certainty equilibrium y t is constant, so equation (42) yields
Substituting the above solution into equation (44) and integrating give
So unless = 1, in which case there is a continuum of certainty equilibria, the unique certainty equilibrium is given by y t = 0.
In the self-ful…lling stochastic equilibrium, assume that y t is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2 z . Based on the simple response function given by equation (42), signal extraction implies
Then market clearing requires
Since this relationship has to hold for every realization of y t , we need
which implies
Thus, 2 z is pinned down uniquely and it de…nes the self-ful…lling equilibrium. Note that if < 1, 
A Competitive Model with Investment
There is a continuum of …rms indexed by j. Each period, after observing a …rm speci…c idiosyncratic productivity shock " jt and the market real wage W t , …rms hire labor. They maximize pro…ts where N jt is labor and K jt capital for …rm j: Employment then is
and the revenue net of labor cost is
where R t is the competitive market rate of return. The …rms'investment decisions are made before observing jt or R t . Firm j has a convex cost function
and solves
where S jt is a signal received by …rm j about the market rate of return for investment. Suppose = 1 (generalizing is straightforward) so …rm j invests
De…ne
Aggregate labor supply is N = 1, so integrating (52) the labor market equilibrium requires
and the competitive market return on capital is
Equilibrium is characterized by two equations. First, we have equation (56). Second, using (55) and (58) and setting A = 1 without loss of generality, we have
To complete the model, we assume that the signal S jt is noisy and is de…ned by the log-linear weighted sum: s jt log S jt = log jt + (1 ) log K t .
Certainty Equilibrium
The unique certainty equilibrium can be solved as
. For example, if we assume, without loss of generality, that " jt = log jt is distributed normally with mean 2 " and variance 2 " , then
jt dj = 1 and K t = 1.
Uncertainty Equilibrium
Proposition 5 Under the signal log s jt = log jt + (1 ) log K t , there exists another equilibrium such that k t log K t = k + z t where z t represents investor sentiment and is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2 z . In addition, k =
.
Note in this example that, if we ignore the constant term k, we can rewrite equation (59) in a log-linear form as
and rewrite equation (56) approximately as
This is just a special case of the model in section 7.1 with = 1 < 0, 0 = 1 and 2 v = 0. We can apply equation (50) directly to obtain 2 z . Again, as in our baseline model, the investment level in the uncertainty equilibrium is lower than that in the certainty equilibrium.
A Monetary Business Cycle Model with Imperfect Information
Our second example is based on Hellwig (2008) . We introduce an idiosyncratic cost shock into the …rm's problem in the Hellwig model. There is a continuum of …rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. Each …rm sets its (log-) price p jt equal to its expectation of a target price p jt , i.e. we have p jt = E jt p jt . The target price depends on the aggregate price p t = R p jt dj and its unit cost of production. The unit cost in turn depends on an idiosyncratic cost shock " jt and aggregate output y t (aggregate output y t a¤ects the common wage rate). Hence we have 
and
If we assume that " jt are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 " , the certainty equilibrium is p t = 0. However, there also exists a stochastic equilibrium where p t is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
in accordance with equation (50).
Conclusion
We often talk about the microfoundations of the macroeconomy, but seldom discuss the macrofoundations of the microeconomy (as Keynes did in the past). In reality, the outcome of individual agents'optimal plans often depend crucially on macroeconomic conditions over which agents can have signi…cant in ‡uence collectively but little in ‡uence individually. When agents'optimal decisions must be conditioned on their expectations of such macroeconomic conditions, such expectations can be self-ful…lling when synchronized.
We explored the Keynesian insight that changing sentiments or expectations about aggregate demand can generate self-ful…lling output ‡uctuations under rational expectations when information is noisy and imperfect. If production (or investment) decisions must be made in advance under uncertain demand (or rates of return), optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate self-ful…lling stochastic equilibria in simple production economies without externalities, persistent informational frictions, or aggregate shocks to fundamentals. Our results hold even though there is strategic substitutability rather than strategic complenentarity across the actions of agents (e.g., the optimal output of a …rm declines with aggregate output and the optimal investment of each …rm declines with the aggregate capital stock). Although our settings are very simple, the basic logic of our argument may be applied more generally, to richer and more complicated DSGE models.
A Appendix
A. 1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Equation (17) gives the optimal output of …rms contingent on their signals s jt ; since it is derived using equations (3) and (4), it already embodies the market clearing for labor and consumption. It can be written as:
In order to calculate the conditional expectation we …rst note that the conditional distribution of
z t is still a normal distribution. Note also then that E t exp( 1 " jt + 1 z t )js jt is the moment generating function of the normal random variable
We have,
Denote the conditional variance by
z t are Gaussian, the conditional variance s will not depend on observations s jt and will be given by
We then have
Now for equilibrium to hold we need aggregate demand to equal the output of the …nal good produced using the intermediate goods supplied. Markets will clear if, from equation (18), we have for each z t ;
Matching the coe¢ cients yields two constraints:
(A.12)
(A.13)
(A.14)
we can solve for 2 z so this equality holds. We have
so we assume 0 < < 1 2 : 10 Now we consider the two constants 0 and ' 0 . First we have, using (A.16),
The second line follows from equations (A.5) and (A.11).
Then, from equation (A.9),
From equation (A.15) we have,
Combining these implies
Simplifying further gives,
Therefore the outputs of intermediate goods …rms, conditioned on signals
are given by,
They constitute a market clearing stochastic rational expectations equilibrium. Now to show that the mean of the self-ful…lling stochastic equilibrium exceeds that of the certainty equilibrium, note
. This implies that 0 < , and the mean output of the self-ful…lling equilibrium is lower than that of the certainty equilibrium.
A. 2 Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3
We start with the proof of the self-ful…lling equilibrium, Proposition 3, and give the proof of Proposition 2 for the certainty equilibrium later below.
1. The Self-Ful…llling Equilibrium: Let s jt = v jt + " jt + (1 ) z t . Firms conjecture that output is equal to
as before where 0 ; and 2 z are constants to be determined. As in the previous case, the optimal output of a …rm can be written as
Note that
where
z t are Gaussian, the conditional variance s will not depend on the observed s jt and will be given by
where now
Matching the coe¢ cients yields two constraints: If 6 = 0, then (when 6 = 0) implies 
2
" in the previous case where the signal was
The reason is that the signal is now more noisy, and …rms attribute a smaller fraction of the signal to demand ‡uctuations.
Now we consider the two constants 0 and ' 0 . First we have, using (A.16),
Then, from equation (A.39),
From equation (A.46) we have,
are given by
They constitute a market clearing stochastic rational expectations equilibrium. Note also that
as in the proof of Proposition 1. We now turn to the case of the certainty equilibrium.
2. The Certainty Equilibrium: Now …rms again take aggregate output as constant so z t = 0 and log Y t = y t = 0 ; but the signal s jt = " jt + v jt gives them imperfect information on their idiosyncratic shock. We can compute the new certainty equilibrium by setting z t = 2 z = 0; we have
(A.58)
2 "
Note that if 2 v = 0; then = 1 and 0 = 0 :
A. 3 Proof of Proposition 4
In our previous case, output was equal to y t = z t + 0 . Now the agent receives two signals. The …rst is s jt = " jt + (1 )y t + v jt , which is equivalent to s jt = " jt + (1 )z t + v jt as 0 is common knowledge. The second signal is s pt = z t + e t , where we can interpret e t as common noise in the public forecast of aggregate demand. Conjecture that output is equal to We now turn to the certainty equilibrium. From (A.69) and (A.70), if 1 6 = 0, we must have = 1. Namely aggregate output will be y t = 0 + z t + e t ; (A.86)
If the public signal is still as s pt = z t + e t it fully reveals aggregate demand y t . The private signal would now be s jt = " jt + (1 )[z t + e t ] + v jt = " jt + (1 )[(y t 0 )] + v jt where by construction y t 0 will be known. If we de…neẑ t = z t + e t ; and attempt to de…ne an equilibrium analogous to the certainty equilibrium of Proposition 2 , with the di¤erence that the aggregate demand shock ẑ t = z t +e t is not taken as zero but is perfectly observed each period prior to the production decision, we reach a contradiction. Setting z t = 0; the "constant" term 0 can be de…ned to include e t and solved as in Proposition 2 as a function of time-invariant parameters of the model. However this will contradict the randomness of e t unless e t = 0 for all t: The certainty equilibrium of Proposition 2 with constant output is not compatible with a time-varying public forecast of aggregate demand since …rms would forecast the constant output. The public signal s pt = z t + e t would be observed in the self-ful…lling equilibrium, but in the certainty equilibrium the public forecast of aggregate output would be a constant, and identical to the equilibrium in Proposition 2. If on the other hand we use our assumption that the variance of the forecast error of the public signal is proportional to the variance of z; that is if 2 e = 2 z ; then we can recover the certainty equilibrium of Proposition 2 where output is constant: for this equilibrium we would have z t = e t = 0 for all t:
A. 4 Proof of Proposition 5
Notice according to equation (59) where s is the conditional variance of ( 1)z t + " jt based on s jt . Aggregate capital is log K t = k + z t = log E expf" jt + k jt g = log E expf" jt +k + " jt + (1 )z t g (A.88) Hence the uncertainty equilibrium has a lower mean than the certainty equilibrium.
